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Presidential Removal: Impeachment as a Tool 
to Promote Democracy in Haïti 
 




I began writing this note in 2019, the same year that Congress im-
peached former United States President Donald J. Trump, for the first time, 
and members of the Haïtian parliament attempted to impeach President 
Jovenel Moïse.  I was struck by the similarities and differences in the im-
peachment processes, especially given the countries’ entwined histories.  
Now, in 2021, I know that both impeachment proceedings failed to remove 
either president, despite credible accusations of corruption.  Furthermore, 
both presidents afterwards called for further consolidation of executive 
power, even as their allotted times in office came to a close. 
Another compelling question is why it matters if a president is re-
movable from office before his1 term expires.  Political scientists have long 
believed that one of the greatest perils of a presidential democracy is its stag-
nation.2  As this article discusses later, Haïti’s semi-presidential democracy 
runs the same risk.  When faced with stagnation, a presidential term can be 
interrupted in seven ways: resignation, impeachment, declaration of incapac-
ity, popular recall, coup, assassination, or foreign invasion.3  Haïti has al-
ready experienced a number of undemocratic presidential removals—includ-
ing by coups, assassinations, and foreign invasions—since gaining 
independence in 1804.  More recently, the country’s political and economic 
 
        *     Brynna Bolt is a Juris Doctorate candidate at the University of California, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law.  She is also a leader of the Hastings-to-Haïti Partnership, a student organization 
that advances the rule of law and promotes human rights in Haïti by supporting the country’s legal 
education and engaging in human rights advocacy.  Brynna would like to thank her advisor, Blaine 
Bookey, for her help with this note. 
 1. Throughout this paper, I use the pronouns “he/him/his” to refer to the President or Prime 
Minister’s office or official duties.  Haïti has had both male and female identifying Presidents and 
Prime Ministers.  I use “he/him/his” because the offices are currently or were most recently filled 
by men. 
 2. Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Democracy, 1 J. OF DEMOCRACY 51, 54 (1990). 
 3. Leiv Marsteintredet and Einar Berntzen, Reducing the Perils of Presidentialism in Latin 
America Through Presidential Interruptions, 41 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 83, 88–89 (Oct. 2008). 
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elite, or politique de doublure, 4 have used coups, specifically, to maintain 
their elite status.  Furthermore, foreign states have played significant roles in 
these unconstitutional transitions of power.  Adopting democratic removal 
processes that are more likely to succeed could mean preventing stagnation 
and coups, as well as giving the Haïtian people greater opportunity to partic-
ipate in their government. 
 President Moïse’s term officially expired on February 7, 2021, 
sparking a constitutional crisis.5  President Moïse maintains that, because he 
did not take office until a year after he was elected, he should have another 
year in office remaining.6  Haïti’s judiciary branch disagrees, and protestors 
have once again taken to the streets in Port-au-Prince, admonishing President 
Moïse as a dictator.7  Furthermore, Haïti’s legislature has been completely 
empty since the beginning of 2020, and no one has passed the election law 
necessary to hold a presidential race.8  In February, the Biden Administration 
in the United States announced its support for Moïse.9  President Moïse con-
tinues to call for a constitutional referendum to rewrite the 1987 Constitution 
of the Republic of Haïti (the 1987 Constitution), currently set for June of 
2021.10  However, this rewrite would likely be a step closer to another dicta-
torship in Haïti, rather than towards constitutional order.  
This note focuses on impeachment—the legal process by which the 
legislature, in some cases together with the judiciary, votes to remove a pres-
ident—as a democratic presidential removal procedure.  This note discusses 
the ways in which Haïtian lawmakers might improve the country’s impeach-
ment process to better serve the purpose of peacefully removing a corrupt 
and unpopular president.  Furthermore, this note looks to how the process of 
impeachment might be molded to hold the entire government accountable to 
the will of the Haïtian people.  The recommendations are made looking to 
the impeachment processes of other recently formed democracies as models 
 
 4. Politique de doublure literally translates to “politics of the double.”  In Haïti, the phrase 
is used to refer to the small group of elite citizens (one to two percent of Haïti’s total population) 
who control the country’s economy, as well as much of its government, from behind the scenes.  
Layla Quran, Why Haïtians Say They Won’t Stop Protesting, PBS (Dec. 5, 2019, 5:05 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/why-haitians-say-they-wont-stop-protesting. 
 5. Harold Isaac, Andre Paultre & Maria Abi-Habib, Haïti Braces for Unrest as a Defiant 
President Refuses to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2021), https://www.ny-
times.com/2021/02/07/world/americas/haiti-protests-President-Jovenel-Mois.html?auth=login-
google.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Clément Jude Charles, The Context for Haïti’s Ongoing Constitutional Reform Process, 
CONSTITUTIONNET (Dec. 12, 2020), https://constitutionnet.org/news/context-haitis-ongoing-con-
stitutional-reform-process.  
 9. Isaac et al., supra note 5. 
 10. Brian Concannon, Is the Whitehouse Greenlighting Haiti’s Descent Into Dictatorship?, 
RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT (March 9, 2021), https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/03/09/the-
biden-administration-is-greenlighting-haitis-descent-towards-dictatorship/.  
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Haïti can draw from.  This note analyzes democratic processes in three coun-
tries—Brazil, Paraguay, and South Korea—that have impeached a sitting 
president in the last decade.11  Their reasons for impeaching presidents have 
varied.  In Latin America, both the Brazilian and Paraguayan legislatures 
removed their heads of state based on accusations of corruption and political 
unpopularity, respectively.12  South Korea’s legislature—with the approval 
of its Constitutional Court—impeached its president for betraying state se-
crets.13   
Part I categorizes Haïti’s democracy and identifies the provisions 
outlining the impeachment process in its constitution.  Part II discusses the 
role of impeachment in Haïti’s semi-presidential democracy.  Part III sum-
marizes the history of presidential removal in Haïti since 1987, through the 
recent failed impeachment of President Moïse.  Part IV compares the Para-
guayan, Brazilian, and South Korean impeachment processes—including 
their relevant actors, definitions of impeachable offenses, and procedures es-
tablishing who succeeds an impeached president—and offers recommenda-
tions on which aspects could support constitutional norms14 in Haïti. 
 
I. The Current Provisions for Impeachment in Haïti’s 1987 Constitu-
tion 
 
The first step in analyzing the role of impeachment in Haïti is cate-
gorizing the type of democracy that the country practices.  There are three 
main types of democracies in effect today—presidential democracy, semi-
presidential democracy, and parliamentary.  In a presidential democracy, the 
President, who is both the head of the executive branch and the symbolic 
head of state, is elected directly by popular vote for a fixed term.15  The leg-
islature is separate from the executive and independently elected for a fixed 
term by popular vote.16  By contrast, in a parliamentary system, the Prime 
Minister is the head of the government.17  Finally, in a semi-presidential de-
mocracy, executive functions are split between the President and the Prime 
Minister.18  The type of democracy that a country practices affects whether 
or not a head of the executive branch can be removed by impeachment, who 
will be the relevant actors, and what happens after removal.  
 
 11. See Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq, & David Landau, The Uses and Abuses of Impeachment 
Power (Univ. of Chi., Public Law Working Paper No. 731, 2020). 
 12. Id. at 6. 
 13. Id. at 10. 
 14. Meaning adherence to principles of constitutional law, including checks and balances be-
tween the branches. 
 15. Linz, supra note 2, at 52–53. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Robert Elgie, Variations on a Theme, 16 J. OF DEMOCRACY 98, 107 (July 2005).  
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The 1987 Constitution establishes the Haïtian government as a semi-
presidential democracy, with the President and Prime Minister sharing the 
responsibilities of the executive branch.19  The President is the head of state 
and manages the armed forces, enforcement of the law, and international re-
lations.20  The Prime Minister manages the day-to-day activities of the gov-
ernment.21  In addition to the split executive branch, Haïti’s government has 
an independently elected legislature.22  In the legislature, representatives to 
the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house, are elected “in direct universal 
suffrage” (i.e. by a popular vote) for terms of four years.23  Representatives 
to the Senate, the upper house, are popularly elected for six-year terms.24  
When a joint session is held between the two houses, they are referred to as 
the National Assembly.25   
 The President is more limited in the length and number of terms he may 
serve: the President can be elected for a term of five years, twice, and non-
consecutively.26  Haïtian lawmakers wrote the 1987 Constitution as the Du-
valiers’ decades long dictatorship crumbled in 1986, and its limits on the 
presidential office may reflect its drafters’ reluctance to give too much power 
to the new head of state.27  The President then appoints a Prime Minister who 
must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.28  Therefore, while 
the Prime Minister is not directly elected, he is chosen through representa-
tives of the people.  Each branch, in theory, is independent in its powers and 
 
 19. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI Mar. 29, 1987, art. 133. 
 20. Id. at arts. 136–47, amended by Loi constitutionnelle de 2012 portant amendement de la 
Constitution de 1987.  
 21. Id. at arts. 158–65, amended by Loi constitutionnelle de 2012 portant amendement de la 
Constitution de 1987. 
 22. Id. at art. 59. 
 23. Id. at art. 94. 
 24. Id. at arts. 92, 95, amended by Loi constitutionnelle de 2012 portant amendement de la 
Constitution de 1987. 
 25. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI Mar. 29, 1987, art. 98, amended by Loi cons-
titutionnelle de 2012 portant amendement de la Constitution de 1987. 
 26. Id. at art. 134, amended by Loi constitutionnelle de 2012 portant amendement de la Cons-
titution de 1987. 
 27. In the three decades before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Francois Duvalier and 
his son, Jean Claude, brutally repressed individual liberties and political opposition and drained the 
country of its financial resources for their own benefit.  The Duvaliers’ personal military, the 
Tonton Makout, murdered tens of thousands of Haïtians.  It was following these violations of po-
litical, civil, and human rights, that the provisional military government, the National Governing 
Council, established a Constituent Assembly mandated with drafting a new constitution.  LAWYERS 
COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PAPER LAWS STEEL BAYONETS: A BREAKDOWN OF THE RULE OF 
LAW IN HAÏTI 2, 4 (New York 1990); see also Andre Paultre, Haïti Moves Closer to a Constitutional 
Referendum, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2020, 11:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-poli-
tics/haiti-moves-closer-to-constitutional-referendum-elections-idUSKCN26A0W9. 
 28. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI Mar. 29, 1987, art. 137, amended by Loi 
constitutionnelle de 2012 portant amendement de la Constitution de 1987. 
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provides checks and balances on the others.  No branch “may, for any reason 
. . . go beyond the bounds set for them by the Constitution and the law.”29   
Under the 1987 Constitution, both the President and the Prime Min-
ister are subject to impeachment.30  Chapter Five of Title Five of the 1987 
Constitution provides the procedures to impeach a sitting President.31  The 
process is bicameral and carried out by the legislature’s two houses, the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with oversight by the Supreme Court.32   
According to the 1987 Constitution, the Chamber of Deputies must, 
by a two-thirds majority, indict the President for “the crime of high treason 
or any other crime or offense committed in the discharge of his duties.”33  
The Senate may then constitute itself as a High Court of Justice, presided 
over by the President of the Senate and the President and Vice President of 
the Supreme Court, to review the charges.34  Members of the Senate elect 
from among themselves a Committee of Enquiry to investigate the allega-
tions of wrongdoing.35  The guilty verdict must be confirmed by a two-thirds 
majority of the High Court of Justice and may result only in the President’s 
dismissal and disqualification from office for up to fifteen years; the High 
Court of Justice cannot impose any criminal penalties on the President.36  No 
other law further elucidates how to conduct an impeachment proceeding in 
Haïti, and no impeachment attempts have successfully established any prec-
edent.  
 
II. The Role of Impeachment in Haïti’s Semi-Presidential Democracy 
 
In Haïti, like in other democracies, the technical role of impeach-
ment is to remove the President as the head of state.  More importantly, im-
peachment is one of the few ways to interrupt a presidential or semi-presi-
dential democracy and hold the executive branch accountable.  Impeachment 
may also serve as a mechanism for “restarting” a political system as a whole 
and promoting constitutional order.  
 
 29. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI Mar. 29, 1987, at art. 60.  The similarities 
between Haïti’s semi-presidential democracy and that of France are a lingering effect of French 
imperialism in the region.  Robert Elgie, Duverger, Semi-Presidentialism and the Supposed French 
Archetype, 32 WEST EUROPEAN POL. 248 (Mar. 2009). 
 31. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI Mar. 29, 1987, at art. 185-90. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at arts. 185–86. 
 34. Id. at arts. 185.  
 35. Id. at arts. 188-1. 
 36. Id. at art. 189-1. 
 37. Linz, supra note 2, at 54. 
 38. Marsteintredet & Berntzen, supra note, at 3. 
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Originally, academics identified rigidity as a major flaw of presiden-
tial democracies.37  More recently, however, articles have questioned 
whether these regimes are as rigid as once believed.38  Some jurists have 
gone so far as to argue that the main benefit of fixed terms and strict divisions 
between executive and legislative branches is that—once formed—these de-
mocracies are relatively stable.39  According to Tom Ginsburg, a lawyer and 
professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, the opposite is 
seen in purely parliamentary systems in which the Prime Minister serves as 
the sole elected head of government.40  In England, for example, a vote of no 
confidence and quick follow-up elections can dismantle the administration 
in a matter of weeks.41  By comparison, impeachment is a longer process 
filled with more hurdles to overcome before a president is removed.  But 
stability can harden into stagnation, or rigidity, particularly if presidents are 
elected for multiple terms or if one party remains in power for too long.42  
Impeachment, therefore, is a necessary tool to counteract the risks that ac-
company a stagnant political system, including increased susceptibility to 
military coups.43  Prolonged stasis, according to Ginsburg, can make presi-
dential systems unresponsive to public opinion and create an opportunity for 
political opposition to take unconstitutional measures—such as military 
coups—to remove presidents.44   
As a solution, Ginsburg and his colleagues propose governments 
adopt new models of impeachment that take into account the broader politi-
cal context of their countries.45 Contemporary provisions for impeachment 
proceedings, including those in Haïti’s 1987 Constitution, focus on holding 
accountable a single “bad actor” (i.e. the President).46  This no longer makes 
sense if attempted removals of the executive are the result of unresponsive-
ness or corruption throughout the government.47  In such situations, Ginsburg 
argues that impeachment can serve as the “hard reset” a government needs.48   
While Ginsburg’s view of impeachment casts the process as a polit-
ical tool to be wielded during a democratic crisis, other jurists have studied 
 
 39. See Ginsburg, Huq, & Landau, supra note 11. 
 40. Id. 
 41. What is a Vote of No Confidence?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46890481. 
 42. See How Impeachment Works Outside America, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/12/16/how-impeachment-works-outside-america. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Ginsburg, Huq, & Landau, supra note 11.  
 46. Id. at 7. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 45. 
 49. FRANK O. BOWMAN III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF 
IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP 193 (Cambridge University Press 2019). 
 50. Id. at 235. 
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impeachment as a sign of prevailing constitutional order.  Frank Bowman 
III, author and law professor at University of Missouri School of Law, de-
scribes the primary function of impeachment as constitutionally limiting the 
conduct of presidents.49  Even though Bowman acknowledges that impeach-
ment is “ultimately constrained by political norms,” he argues that impeach-
ment serves the will of the people through their elected representatives 
within a constitutionally defined structure.50  By making impeachment more 
difficult than a parliamentary vote, the process implicitly recognizes the sta-
tus of the President as the head of a co-equal branch of government.51  As 
such, he cannot be removed unless he violates the parameters of his office as 
laid out by his country’s constitution.  Political scientists Leiv Marsteintredet 
and Einar Berntzen, whose work builds on that of Juan J. Linz, agree that a 
successful impeachment may be seen as proof that democratic rules and pro-
cedures are working, rather than as a reflection of democratic crisis.52  In-
creased use of impeachment, furthermore, reduces stagnation and raises the 
degree of accountability between branches.53 
As the next section of this note will show, clashes between the Ha-
ïtian political and economic elite—who, aided by foreign states, historically 
have held most of the power in Haïti’s government—and the greater popu-
lace is a major cause of instability in the country’s semi-presidential democ-
racy.  Since 1987, periods of stability seem to last as long as this finite group 
and their allies abroad are satisfied that the Haïtian head of state acts in their 
interest.  On the other hand, the politique de doublure have aided with impu-
nity the unconstitutional removal of popularly elected presidents who 
threaten their power and control.54  Professor Cécile Accilien, Haïtian native 
and Director of the University of Kentucky’s Institute for Haïtian Studies in 
the Department of African and African-American Studies, believes the poli-
tique de doublure may already be influencing the popular movement against 
President Moïse.55  If constitutional measures continue to fail in shifting the 
power dynamic in Haïti, stagnation could lead to another coup against its 
President.  Thus, impeachment may serve both a political and constitutional 
 
 51. BOWMAN, supra note 49, at 236. 
 52. Marsteintredet & Berntzen, supra note 3, at 91. 
 53. Id. at 97. 
 54. Rick Hellman, Expert Says Technology Helps Fuel Anti-Government Protests in Haïti, 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS (Oct. 14, 2019), http://today.ku.edu/2019/10/14/expert-says-technology-
helps-fuel-anti-government-protests-haiti.  
 55. Id. 
 56. See PETER HALLWARD, DAMMING THE FLOOD (Verso 2007). 
 57. Id. at 32.  By comparison, only sixty-one percent of Americans cast ballots in the 2016 
presidential elections.  Thom File, Voting in America: A Look at the 2016 Presidential Election, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 10, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-sam-
plings/2017/05/voting_in_america.html. 
PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL: IMPEACHMENT AS A TOOL TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN HAÏTI 
Summer 2021 PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL 613 
function by removing a politically unpopular president within the parameters 
of the 1987 Constitution. 
 
III. Political Context Around Presidential Removal in Haïti Since the 
1987 Constitution 
 
The source of political instability in Haïti today can be traced back 
to the coups that undemocratically removed its first elected president, Presi-
dent Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  As previously mentioned, a committee of law-
makers drafted Haïti’s Constitution in 1987, as the Duvalier dictatorship 
came to an end.56  When the new democracy held its first presidential elec-
tions in 1990, eighty percent of the electorate turned out to vote.57  President 
Aristide, leader of the Lavalas party, won with sixty-seven percent of the 
vote.58  However, the politique de doublure, with support from the United 
States, quickly undermined the results of these constitutionally mandated 
elections.  
Aristides’ victory was the result of the “energetic mobilization” of 
hundreds of grassroots organizations.59  He was especially popular among 
poorer demographics of Haïtians because of his socially conscious rhetoric 
and programs.60  However, this same speech and action worried Haïti’s po-
litical and economic elite.61  Eventually, even members of the socially-liberal 
elite, who had hoped that Aristide would act as a “moral figurehead of a 
government staffed by members of the traditional political class,” turned 
against him.62  These politique de doublure gathered their resources to pay 
the military to conduct a coup, and—with the help of the United States gov-
ernment—these forces ousted Aristide in 1991.63 
The four years after President Aristide’s removal were among the 
most violent in Haïtian history.  An interim government took over the coun-
try’s political system.64  At their behest, the paramilitary group—Révolution-
naire pour l’avancement et le progrès Haïtien (“FRAPH”)—and, its leader 
Emmanuel “Toto” Constant, led brutal attacks on neighborhoods with repu-
tations for being pro-Lavalas.65  The violence grew so extreme, and the flow 
 
 58. HALLWARD, supra note 56, at 32. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 33-34. 
 62. Id. at 35. 
 63. Id. at 34. 
 64. HALLWARD, supra note 56, at 40. 
 65. The United States Central Intelligence Agency not only kept Constant and other high-
ranking officers of FRAPH on its payroll, but also maintained a campaign against Aristide in Wash-
ington.  Id. at 42–44. 
 66. Id. at 50. 
 67. Id. at 44.  
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of refugees out of Haïti so intense, that the international community insisted 
that the interim government reinstate Aristide as President in 1994.66  La-
valas never regained the same political momentum, however, after so many 
of its supporters were killed or arrested.67  
Another coup against President Aristide, after he was elected for a 
second term in 2000, further weakened Haïti’s democracy.  This time, Pres-
ident Aristide faced opposition from the politique de doublure, paramilitary 
groups, including Front pour la libération et la reconstruction nationales 
(“FLRN”), and international forces.68  After three years of more intense vio-
lence throughout the country, rebel groups finally deposed President Aristide 
in 2004.69  President Aristide’s removal from office was completed by for-
eign intervention, however, when the French and American governments 
smuggled him on a plane, out of Haïti, and into the Central African Repub-
lic.70  The official French-American story paints their interference as a res-
cue, while President Aristide reports that, on the night of February 29, 2004, 
he was abducted from his home and forced to resign yet again.71   
To fill the void left by his administration, the United States and the 
politique de doublure installed another interim government.72  The Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court stepped in as acting President, and United States 
Ambassador James Foley took over as Prime Minster.73  The provisional 
government then waited two years to hold elections to replace President 
Aristide.74  This delay further damaged Haïti’s democracy by postponing 
constitutionally required elections.75  Nevertheless, the Haïtian electorate 
continued fighting for self-rule, and nearly sixty percent of eligible Haïtians 
participated in the 2006 election of President Réne Préval.76  These Haïtians 
chose to participate in the democratic process despite voter suppression 
 
 68.  Jeb Sprague, The FLRN’s Family Tree: A Who’s Who of Supporters of Guy Philippe’s 
2000-2004 Paramilitary Insurgency in Haïti, HAÏTI LIBERTÉ (June 7, 2017), https://haitili-
berte.com/the-flrns-family-tree-a-whos-who-of-supporters-of-guy-philippes-2000-2004-paramili-
tary-insurgency-in-haiti/. 
 69. See HALLWARD, supra note 56, at 210–16. 
 70. Id. at 232–36. 
 71. Id. at 239–40 (quoting an interview that President Aristide gave with Anderson Cooper 
on CNN on Mar. 1, 2004).  
 72. Id. at 258–60. 
 73. Id. at 259. 
 74. Michael Keefer, Fraud and Scandal in Haïti’s Presidential Election: Preval’s Victory and 
the U.N.’s Disgrace, IJDH (Mar. 3, 2006), http://www.ijdh.org/2006/03/archive/fraud-and-scan-
dal-in-haiti%E2%80%99s-presidential-election-preval%E2%80%99s-victory-and-the-
un%E2%80%99s-disgrace/. 
 75. Id.  
 76. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 109th CONG., HAÏTIAN ELECTIONS: SETTING THE FOUNDATION 
FOR DEMOCRACY (Comm. Print 2006). 
 77. Keefer, supra note 74.   
 78. DAVID ROSNICK, CEPR, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IN HAÏTI: ELECTION 
MONITORING OR POLITICAL INTERVENTION? 4 (Aug. 2011), https://cepr.net/documents/publica-
tions/haiti-oas-2011-10.pdf.  
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tactics, including arbitrary arrests of candidates and voters and the threat and 
actual use of violence at and around voting sites.77 
Foreign states and the political and economic elite continued to med-
dle in the next series of presidential elections in 2011.  Fanmi Lavalas, the 
contemporary iteration of President Aristide’s political party since the 2000 
elections, was excluded all-together.78  This exclusion, in addition to the fact 
that Haïti was recovering from a 7.0 magnitude earthquake that killed 
250,000 people and displaced five million, drove the percentage of Haïtian 
voters who turned out to vote down to only twenty-three percent.79  Then, 
after Haïtian election committees inexplicably threw out nearly 7,000 “irreg-
ular ballots,” Michel Martelly, a Haïtian pop singer and founder of the Tèt 
Kale party, advanced to the final round of elections and eventually became 
President.80  Political opponents of Martelly protested when, in the final 
round of elections, another fifteen to eighteen percent of ballots were dis-
carded.81  The Organization of American States approved the inexplicable 
results, but observers speculated that the United States and the Haïtian bour-
geoisie played a role in Martelly’s conspicuous advancement.82  Kim Ives, 
editor of the English language sections of the Haïtian newsweekly Haïti 
Liberté, refers to this era as the end of genuine elections in Haïti, and the 
beginning of a puppet regime representing primarily the United States alli-
ance with the Haïtian political and economic elite.83 
As President, Martelly oversaw the passing of amendments to the 
1987 Constitution in 2012.84  The previous legislature had passed the first 
draft of the Amendments, and there was controversy surrounding whether 
the versions passed under the Martelly Administration matched those intro-
duced under Préval.85  The Amendments created new instutions, such as a 
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Constitutional Council, which this article discusses later, and granted dual 
citizenship rights.86  The new Amendments also established a gender quota, 
requiring that thirty percent of employees in the public sector be women.87 
Jovenel Moïse ran in the next presidential elections as the hand-se-
lected successor of President Martelly.88  The 2016 elections were first 
stalled for nearly fourteen months, and then the losing candidates challenged 
the results after learning that local elections committees had discarded at 
least ten percent of cast ballots for “irregularities.”89  These committees fur-
ther reported flagging up to ninety-two percent of the ballots as suspect.90  
Haïti’s electoral council ultimately upheld President Moïse’s win, and the 
United States, unsurprisingly, lauded its decision as a return to constitutional 
rule in Haïti.91  
Protestors began calling for President Moïse’s impeachment after 
Haïti’s High Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (the “High 
Court”) issued a report placing his former company, Agritrans, at the center 
of a massive embezzlement scheme in 2019.92  The scheme involved the 
Venezuelan oil program PetroCaribe, which was established by the country’s 
former President, Hugo Chavez, to lend oil to developing countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean at low interest rates.93  In 2006, Haïti accepted 
two billion dollars’ worth of oil from the program and promised that the sav-
ings would be funneled into infrastructure and social programs.94  By 2019—
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the government had spent the money.95  Though the program eventually ter-
minated as a result of Venezuela’s own political instability, Haïti still owes 
the Venezuelan government two billion dollars.96 
One contract sponsored by the PetroCaribe program hired Agritrans 
to rebuild a rural stretch of road in northern Haïti.97  However, another firm—
with the same tax identification number, government patent, technical staff, 
and resumé of projects in its portfolio as Agritrans—had already contracted 
to build the road.98  The only difference between the two companies was their 
Chief Executive Officers, Moïse and another man.99  To the High Court, the 
production of two identical contracts for the same road was “nothing less 
than a scheme to embezzle funds.”100  The Haïtian government gave 
Agritrans advance payment for the job in 2014—immediately before Presi-
dent Moïse announced his campaign.101  In response to the report, President 
Moïse’s attorney issued a statement maintaining that Agritrans was only fix-
ing a portion of the road and President Moïse was not connected to the pro-
ject.102  However, the High Court countered that President Moïse was re-
sponsible for supervising and signing contracts at the time payment was 
issued and, therefore, must have known of the scheme.103 
In August 2019, members of the Chamber of Deputies called for a 
vote to impeach President Moïse, referring to his alleged involvement in the 
Agritrans scandal as “crimes of high treason.”104  President Moïse’s opposi-
tion needed eighty affirmative votes to formally indict him.105  However, al-
most half of the 119 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were at the time empty 
because of the government’s failure to hold elections the previous term. 106  
The rest of the legislators were divided among over twenty parties, most of 
which represented the same politique de doublure who helped Moïse rise to 
power.107  Thus, in a session that began on August 21, 2019—and ended in 
the early hours of the next day—fifty-three of the sixty-one legislators 
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present voted against indictment.108  Only three legislators voted for im-
peachment, while five more abstained.109  Even if the Chamber of Deputies 
had succeeded in impeaching Moïse, a conviction would have been unlikely, 
as the thirty-seat Senate—which is responsible for trying an indicted presi-
dent—was also half empty.110   
Protestors continued to call for President Moïse’s resignation after 
the impeachment vote.  In speaking to a journalist about the protests, Em-
manuela Douyon, a Haïtian economist and participant of the demonstrations 
in Port-au-Prince, is quoted as saying, “It’s about accountability, it’s about 
making politicians accountable to society . . . .  In Haïti, we can fight corrup-
tion as well.  It’s about time they stop and listen to us.”111  Despite this con-
viction, Haïti’s impeachment process failed and President Moïse remained 
in office.  But then, what constitutional alternatives are available to remove 
a corrupt President before the political and economic elite—or the United 
States—instigates another coup?  Or, how may the impeachment process be 
improved to operate more successfully? 
Haïti is at a crossroads in terms of how it wants to handle ongoing 
corruption in its government.  Pierre Labossiere, founder of the political or-
ganization Haïti Action Committee, claims that protests against Moïse are 
about more than installing a new President: Haïtians want a new system that 
holds public servants accountable.112  The Haïtian people’s goal is democ-
racy, and impeachment might be one tool to help achieve this.  Even if a new 
constitution is not borne out of the contemporary popular movement, Haïtian 
lawmakers could improve the current provisions for impeachment to reinsert 
the people’s voice into the political process.  In the following section, an 
analysis of three other countries’ impeachment processes—that of Brazil, 
Paraguay, and South Korea—is offered.  This analysis considers how aspects 
of these different models may, or may not, be advantageous in Haïti. 
 
IV. Questions Surrounding Impeachment 
 
As Ginsburg and Bowman assert, impeachment processes that are 
able to restart a political system in crisis while maintaining constitutional 
order require careful crafting.  This section discusses just some of the aspects 
of impeachment that must be considered, including who will participate in 
impeachments, what will be an impeachable offense, and who succeeds an 
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impeached president.  Furthermore, it analyzes the processes of three coun-
tries—South Korea, Brazil, and Paraguay—and makes recommendations on 
which features of these impeachments may work in the Haïtian context.  The 
recommendations, developed in consultation with leading experts in Haïti’s 
legal system, take into consideration the promotion of integrity throughout 
the Haïtian political system and respect for constitutional norms.  Finally, 
the possibility of constitutional amendments is discussed. 
 
A.  Who Participates in Impeachments? 
 
The first question in framing provisions for impeachment is who will 
have the power to indict and ultimately impeach a president.  In some coun-
tries, the legislature is responsible for the entire impeachment process.  The 
bicameral process splits responsibilities for indicting and convicting between 
the lower and upper houses of the legislature, respectively.  Other countries, 
however, require oversight by another institution, such as a constitutional 
court.   
Both the Brazilian and Paraguayan Constitutions call for the same 
bicameral procedure as is laid out by the 1987 Constitution.  In Paraguay, 
the Chamber of Deputies—the lower house of Congress—must indict a pres-
ident for impeachable offenses by a two-thirds majority.113  The Senate then 
convicts by a two-thirds majority.114  In Brazil, the Chamber of Deputies 
indicts for both common crimes and impeachable offenses by a two-thirds 
majority.115  The Senate can convict for impeachable offenses, while com-
mon crimes are tried through the criminal courts.116 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to continuing to use a 
bicameral impeachment process in Haïti.  Theoretically, a bicameral im-
peachment process benefits a semi-presidential democracy in three ways.  
First, the indictment at the lower level deters presidential misconduct 
through its “detection and referral of impeachable offenses.”117  By indicting 
presidents that exceed their constitutional powers, it sets a precedent that fu-
ture administrations must follow.  Second, a trial in the Senate serves as a 
forum for discussing what constitutes an impeachable offense.118  When the 
legislature, a group of popularly elected representatives, challenges a presi-
dent’s use or misuse of power publicly, the people of a country vicariously 
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insert their voice into the process.  Come the next parliamentary election, 
they can vote out legislators whose conduct during the trial they disagree 
with.  Finally, constitutional provisions that require a super majority of two-
thirds of both houses to indict and convict a president ensure that a president 
cannot be removed by the legislature too easily.119  If the hurdles for removal 
were too low, the legislature and executive would no longer be co-equal 
branches.120 
However, as the failed impeachment of President Moïse demon-
strates, indicting and convicting a president without a complete and partici-
patory legislature—itself a symptom of a democratic crisis—would likely be 
impossible.  When members of the Haïtian legislature moved to indict Pres-
ident Moïse, they lacked the necessary support largely due to the empty seats 
and coalitions in the Chamber of Deputies.121  Coalitions are a common fea-
ture of parliamentary systems, and further delayed elections could perpetuate 
empty seats in Haïti’s National Assembly.122  Therefore, the possibility of 
having to rely on a dysfunctional legislature is a major risk associated with 
the bicameral impeachment structure in Haïti. 
In contrast, South Korea’s Constitution requires that the National 
Assembly, the country’s legislature, jointly indict a president, but the Con-
stitutional Court—a specialized body charged with adjudicating constitu-
tional matters—convicts.  The National Assembly of South Korea approved 
the creation of the Constitutional Court through constitutional amendments 
passed in 1987.123  The charge of the Constitutional Court is to only adjudi-
cate matters of constitutional law, and its duties are separate from those of 
the country’s Supreme Court.124  The Constitutional Court is made up of nine 
justices: three are appointed by the President, three by the National Assem-
bly, and three by the Supreme Court.125  
In 2003, the Constitutional Court of South Korea exonerated Presi-
dent Roh Moo-hyun after his indictment by the National Assembly on 
charges of corruption, contempt for the Constitution and constitutionally es-
tablished bodies, and maladministration.126  In its argument against convic-
tion, the Court concluded that the National Assembly’s corruption charges 
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were aimed at President Roh’s campaign manager, not the President, and that 
the other charges were political in nature and, therefore, not impeachable.127  
Thus, the Constitutional Court made the final decision as to whether Presi-
dent Roh was removed from office.128  
A constitutional court is more insulated from the problems associ-
ated with political coalitions and vacant legislatures (though not entirely 
since the legislature would still need to indict a president on impeachment 
charges).  However, one argument against creating a constitutional court in 
Haïti is that a court is not a politically accountable institution.129  Further-
more, Bowman argues that making a court the ultimate decisionmaker for 
impeachment upsets the “constitutional balance.”130  In South Korea, the 
drafters of the 1987 Amendments got around this issue by ensuring that 
members of its Constitutional Court are nominated by all three branches of 
the government, including those elected by popular vote.131  This means that 
the people, through the legislature and executive, have a say in who serves 
on the Court.  An alternative in the Haïtian context could be that a constitu-
tional court is directly elected.  Furthermore, Constitutional Court justices in 
South Korea are limited to serving only one term.132   
The 1987 Constitution already calls for a Constitutional Council, un-
der the 2012 Amendments.133  Like in South Korea, the members of the 
Council are nominated by all three branches of government for a term of 
three years.134  The Council’s mandate is “to decide on the conflicts which 
oppose the Executive Power and the Legislative Power or the two branches 
of the Legislative Power.”135  However, it does not currently play a role in 
impeachment under the 1987 Constitution.  If the drafters of a new Haïtian 
constitution choose to do so, they could change this. 
Evaluating the potential success of the Constitutional Council’s par-
ticipation in impeachment in Haïti mandates other considerations, as well.  
The ability of a constitutional court to be a neutral adjudicator of constitu-
tional issues would depend on its fortitude against corruption.  Today, many 
members of the judiciary in Haïti—though not all—are susceptible to bribes 
(which both advance a backlogged criminal justice system and alleviate the 
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judges’ own poverty).136  At the same time, while the 1987 Constitution calls 
for an independent judiciary, in practice, the executive and legislative 
branches exert significant influence over the judicial branch.137  Therefore, 
additional measures will need to be taken to strengthen accountability in the 
judiciary for a constitutional court to succeed in Haïti.   
Neither retaining a bicameral process for impeachment in the legis-
lature nor introducing a constitutional court is a guarantee of a successful 
impeachment.  Now that the strengths and weaknesses of each have been 
identified, Haïtian lawmakers may debate who should be involved with the 
impeachment process. 
 
B.  What is an Impeachable Offense?  
 
The creators of a new, or revised, impeachment process in Haïti must 
also consider what is an impeachable offense, and who will create this defi-
nition.  Setting strict standards for what is an impeachable offense may pre-
vent a legislature from impeaching a president anytime it disagrees with his 
policies.  Such standards also delineate when a crime is sufficiently severe, 
and whether it must have been committed during a presidential term.  Addi-
tional laws could be helpful in defining impeachable offenses, or clear direc-
tion from a constitutional court could establish guidelines. 
Under the Paraguayan Constitution, an impeachable offense in-
cludes crimes committed in the exercise of office and other common 
crimes.138  A president may also be impeached for mal desempeño, or the 
poor exercise of his government functions.139  Jurists have criticized this 
standard as too vague, allowing legislators to overthrow a president when 
they disagree with his policy choices.140  For example, in its formal charges 
against Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo, the Paraguayan Chamber of 
Deputies cited his signing of the Ushuaia II Protocol, an international charter 
requiring Paraguay to act in furtherance of democracy and land reforms, as 
well as his inability to alleviate “insecurity in the country.”141  According to 
the Paraguayan Constitution, these actions were legal exercises of President 
Lugo’s executive power.142  However, Paraguay’s Congress disagreed with 
his methods of governance and chose to impeach him. 
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President Lugo’s impeachment demonstrates how the mal desem-
peño standard extends the power of the legislature beyond the bounds of the 
“mutual checks and balances” function of impeachment.143  Lugo was a dem-
ocratically elected president and, even though he lost popularity as his coun-
try’s economy worsened, he continued to act within the parameters of exec-
utive authority.144  A favorable interpretation of President Lugo’s 
impeachment would compare the process to a “vote of no confidence against 
the president.”145  From a less forgiving perspective, his impeachment is 
more similar to a “parliamentary coup.”146  President Lugo’s removal gave 
legal credence to the mal desempeño standard as a circumvention of the sep-
aration of powers and the results of a popular election.147  
In Haïti, a mal desempeño standard for impeachment might under-
mine, rather than promote, constitutional norms.  While it would be easier to 
convict a corrupt executive under a lower standard, having one that is so 
vague places a large amount of discretion in the hands of legislators.  Further, 
while it would be difficult for a half-empty Chamber of Deputies to indict a 
president based on any standard, a vague one might actually be an additional 
incentive for a corrupt president to postpone elections and keep the legisla-
ture empty.  To prevent the executive’s interference with the impeachment 
power and to keep their own ranks accountable, Haïtian lawmakers could 
pass a law with a more precise definition of what counts as an impeachable 
offense. 
Such a law exists in Brazil and labels an impeachable offense as a 
crime de responsabilidade.148  Lei 1079, enacted in 1950, defines impeacha-
ble offenses to include: crimes against the existence of the Union (meaning 
crimes that threaten the existence of the Brazilian federal government); 
crimes against the free exercise of constitutional powers; crimes against the 
exercise of political, individual, and social rights; crimes against homeland 
security; crimes against the administration of justice; crimes against budget 
laws; crimes against the safekeeping and legal employment of public funds; 
and crimes against the enforcement of judicial decisions.149  
In 2016, Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff was impeached under 
Lei 1079.150  Calls for her impeachment arose in the wake of a “kickback 
scheme and bribery scandal” at the oil firm Petrobras, known as “Operation 
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Carwash.”151  According to Brazilian prosecutors, Petrobras inflated con-
tracts, accepted bribes, and channeled portions of the funds into three politi-
cal parties: the Workers Party (President Rousseff’s party), the Democratic 
Movement Party of Brazil, and the Progressive Party.152  The Brazilian crim-
inal courts tried Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President Rouseff’s predecessor, 
as the ringleader of the operation and sentenced him to nine years in jail.153  
The legislature could not impeach President Rouseff for participation in the 
scandal, however, because no evidence linked her directly to any of the 
crimes.154  Furthermore, most of the bribery occurred before her election in 
2011.155  Rouseff was ultimately impeached on unrelated charges of misap-
propriating government funds during her reelection campaign in violation of 
the country’s budget laws.156  The impeachment of President Rouseff exem-
plifies how a law defining impeachable offenses influences what formal 
charges the legislature can bring against a president.   
A Haïtian law carefully defining impeachable offenses could pre-
vent the legislature from impeaching a president for carrying out policies it 
disagrees with, while still holding the executive accountable.  In Haïti, 
crimes de responsabilidade might include corruption or embezzlement—
both of which President Moïse was accused of.  Taking a lesson from Presi-
dent Rouseff’s impeachment, Haïtian lawmakers may also want to decide 
whether presidents should be impeachable for crimes committed before they 
take office or only during their term.  A law allowing for presidents to be 
impeached for crimes they committed before taking office may have helped 
legislators remove President Moïse for his participation in the PetroCaribe 
scandal in 2014.157 
Different still from both Paraguay and Brazil, the Constitutional 
Court of South Korea has set binding precedent that created the standard for 
when a president can be impeached.  When the Constitutional Court over-
turned the impeachment of President Roh, its detailed analysis concluded 
that South Korean presidents can only be impeached for: 1) violations of the 
law, 2) violations committed while in office, and 3) when damage inflicted 
“on the free and democratic basic order is so grave that only removal from 
office can repair the damage.”158  The Constitutional Court found that Presi-
dent Roh both violated election law and showed contempt for the country’s 
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constitution and constitutionally established bodies; however, the Court ul-
timately decided that his removal was unnecessary because his legal viola-
tions were not serious enough to cause lasting harm to constitutional order.159  
The Court also recognized that the legislature indicted President Roh largely 
for political reasons, and impeachment—a legal process—was not the solu-
tion.160 
Following this standard in 2017, the Constitutional Court removed 
South Korean President Park Geun-hye from office for “acts that violated 
the Constitution and laws.”161  The National Assembly indicted President 
Park for divulging state secrets to a confidante, who was later implicated in 
a massive bribery scandal involving the head of Samsung.162  The Constitu-
tional Court convicted President Park, finding that her actions “betrayed the 
trust of the people and were the kind that could not be tolerated for the sake 
of protecting the Constitution.”163   
One major drawback to using a constitutional court’s precedent to 
create a standard for impeachment in Haïti is that judicial decisions require 
time, and another impeachment must take place for there to be such a prece-
dent.  Defining an impeachable offense by law is the ex-ante versus ex-post 
approach.  On the other hand, there is no guarantee that a law on impeach-
ment would pass quickly through the legislature.   Proponents of reshaping 
Haïti’s impeachment process, with the input of the Haïtian electorate, should 
consider these various methods of defining an impeachable offense, while 
taking into account the advantages and risks of a lower or higher standard 
for impeachment. 
 
C.  Who Succeeds an Impeached President? 
 
Finally, Haïtian lawmakers must determine who will succeed a pres-
ident if an impeachment is successful.  In both Paraguay and Brazil, the Vice 
President succeeds an impeached President.164  Vice presidents may be per-
ceived as illegitimate presidents, however, because they are not directly 
elected to the office by popular vote.  Furthermore, they may be involved in 
the same crimes or scandals as those that toppled their predecessors.  Another 
option is to hold entirely new elections in a set amount of time, as South 
Korea’s Constitution requires.  
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In Brazil, President Rouseff was succeeded by her Vice President, 
Michel Temer, per the Brazilian constitution’s mandate.165  Though his ad-
ministration argued that President Temer was a legitimate president because 
he was elected alongside Rouseff, many—including Rouseff—disagreed.166  
Rouseff accused Temer of intentionally sabotaging her administration during 
the impeachment process, an accusation that Temer has since confirmed.167  
Temer, furthermore, battled accusations of corruption while he was Presi-
dent, and authorities then arrested him for his participation in “Operation 
Carwash” soon after he left office.168   
Ginsburg argues that this rule-oriented approach of substituting a 
president with his vice president does not constitute a “political reset” or al-
leviate the problem of stagnation.169  According to Ginsburg, “the vice-pres-
ident model of success raises an obvious possibility of manipulation,” 
whereby those responsible for a president’s removal can essentially hand-
select his successor.170  The predictability of this rule-oriented approach also 
would not work in Haïti because it would make it possible for outside forces, 
such as the politique de doublure, to set up a chosen replacement for the 
President.  Ginsburg prefers the South Korean design as a way of avoiding 
this risk.171 
If there is a vacancy in the office of the President in South Korea, 
whether because of impeachment, or for some other reason, the government 
must hold elections within sixty days.172 Following the impeachment of Pres-
ident Park, Moon Jae In was promptly elected.173  This allowed a complete 
transition of power from President Park’s right-wing coalition to the left-of-
center Democratic Party.174  President Moon’s approval ratings showed that 
the people viewed him as a legitimate president and were in favor of this 
shift in the ruling party.175  
Neither holding new elections immediately after a presidential va-
cancy nor allowing a predesigned successor to take office would work 
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flawlessly in Haïti.  The 1987 Constitution, with the 2012 Amendments 
passed under President Martelly, calls for elections within 120 days of any 
presidential vacancy.176  In the meantime, the Council of Ministers under the 
direction of the Prime Minister is supposed to lead the government.177  How-
ever, civil society argues that an independent council should be created to 
oversee the elections—which will take longer than 120 days—to ensure the 
following elections are truly fair.  Lawmakers should keep these concerns in 
mind when drafting provisions for impeachment.  
  
      D.  Amendments 
 
Another option for updating impeachment proceedings—rather than 
creating an entirely new constitution or passing additional laws defining the 
process—is to amend the 1987 Constitution.  France, a former imperialist 
oppressor in Haïti, amended its Constitution in 2007 to allow for presidential 
impeachment.178  French legislators previously held no such authority, and 
the move represents advancing limitations on an otherwise powerful execu-
tive.179  However, whether changing the constitution through amendments 
makes sense in Haïti depends on how feasible it would be to make such al-
terations legally. 
Passing a constitutional amendment in Haïti is subject to a number 
of restrictions.  Under the 1987 Constitution, the National Assembly may not 
deliberate on a constitutional amendment unless two-thirds of each house of 
the legislature is present.180  Additionally, passing an amendment requires a 
two-thirds majority of the total votes cast.181  The amendment then will not 
enter into effect until the next president’s term.182   
Thus, improving the provisions for impeachment through constitu-
tional amendments would likely be challenging in Haïti.  The current vacan-
cies in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate preclude even a vote, while the 
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prohibition on enacting amendments during a single presidential term means 
that President Moïse could not be impeached under the new process.  Cir-
cumventing these rules, President Moïse has set a date for a constitutional 
referendum in Haïti.  This referendum is likely illegal, and experts have 
called it a “power grab” by Moïse.183  The proposed changes include abol-
ishing the Senate and the position of Prime Minister, replacing these with a 
Vice President picked by the President, and granting him direct control over 
the ministries.184 Essentially, Haïti’s semi-presidential system would be un-
done and power consolidated in the executive branch.  
 
Conclusion: Haïti’s Path Forward 
 
The main goal of democratic processes in Haïti should be ensuring 
that the people’s voice is represented in Haïtian politics, rather than the in-
terests of the politique de doublure or foreign states.  Thus, in order to ad-
vance constitutional order in Haïti, lawmakers must draft a new impeach-
ment process with the country’s political history in mind.  This note 
attempted to lay out several aspects of impeachment for Haïtian lawmakers 
to consider in the event that the 1987 Constitution is rewritten or amended.  
Furthermore, it analyzed the impeachment processes in other countries 
where presidents have been impeached.  The note made recommendations as 
to which features of these other processes may be beneficial to promoting 
constitutional order within the broader context of the Haïtian political sys-
tem.  The possible answers to who should participate in the impeachment 
process, what should be an impeachable offense, and who should succeed an 
impeached president are all essential aspects of the impeachment process and 
were discussed.  
When considering who will participate in impeachments, one risk 
associated with a bicameral process in the legislature is that seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies or Senate will be empty.  Thus, no vote for indictment 
or conviction will pass.  An independent institution like a constitutional court 
may be susceptible to pressure from either the legislature or executive, unless 
its members are held directly accountable to the people through a universal 
vote.  
Furthermore, a vague standard for judging what is an impeachable 
offense would allow the legislature to undermine the executive as a co-equal 
branch of government.  Laws or precedent established by a constitutional 
court defining what is an impeachable offense would prevent the legislature 
from mounting a “parliamentary coup” against the President.  Finally, ensur-
ing that elections quickly follow a president’s removal would prevent the 
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politique de doublure or foreign powers from using an impeachment to place 
government officials they control in positions of power.  These changes to 
the 1987 Constitution could take the form of constitutional amendments, but 
passing amendments is a difficult process and dangerous under the current 
President.  Creating a new constitution altogether, with participation by the 
people, may be more beneficial to democracy in the Haïti. 
